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In the second wave, focus was on groups working with a collection of applications. Theory 
focused on work settings and interaction within well-established communities of practice. Situated 
action, distributed cognition and activity theory were important sources of theoretical reflection, 


































The Apollo Missions 
Ars	Technica	has	a	series	of	articles	detailing	the	early	NASA	Apollo	missions	(Hutchinson,	2012)	
that	feature	interviews	and	analysis	by	former	NASA	flight	controller	Sy	Liebergot.	We	highly	
recommend	these	articles,	they	are	the	most	accessible	descriptions	of	how	NASA	conducted	those	
early	missions,	and	are	fascinating	from	historical,	technical,	and	organizational	perspectives.	While	
there	wasn’t	really	anything	like	HCI	at	the	time	of	the	Apollo	missions,	what	is	described	in	those	
articles	resonates	with	first	wave	concerns.	Each	computer	“console”	was	built	to	optimize	the	fit	
between	it	and	its	controller,	although	it	would	probably	be	more	correct	to	say	that	each	controller	
was	trained	to	operate	each	console	as	efficiently	as	possible.	Consoles	were	far	more	expensive	
than	their	users	at	that	point	in	history,	and	so	it	was	the	user’s	job	to	adapt	to	it,	for	the	most	part.		
	 Each	console	and	flight	controller	was	responsible	for	a	different	discipline,	electrical	
engineering,	communications,	etc.,	and	NASA	still	uses	the	language	of	“multi-disciplinary	
engineering”	today	to	denote	the	specialized	modules	that	comprise	a	missions	staff	and	their	
responsibilities.	However	each	console	was	also	relatively	isolated	from	the	disciplines	around	it.	
There	was	little	formal	communication	between	the	console	operators	and	a	firm	hierarchy	and	
modularity	existed	between	every	console	and	division.	The	reason	for	this	becomes	obvious	when	
you	consider	that	doing	anything	in	space	is	inherently	dangerous.	The	entire	sociotechnical	system	
is	engineered	to	be	predictable,	all	the	mission	parameters	are	known	and	planned	for	well	before	
the	mission	launches.	You	cannot	afford	to	have	unpredictable	information	enter	into	the	system;	it	
could	cause	the	entire	system	to	fail.	So	everything	that	happens	is	checked	and	monitored	by	
multiple	parties	to	ensure	that	it	is	all	within	predictable	limits.	There	is	a	kind	of	emergence	within	
this	system	too,	but	not	necessarily	the	kind	that	Third	Wave	HCI	deals	with.	The	system	is	
engineered	to	achieve	a	kind	of	“weak	emergence”	where	the	collective	acts	in	a	coordinated	and	
distributed	manner	to	achieve	a	result	that	you	could	(and	should)	be	able	to	predict	by	looking	
closely	at	those	interactions.	The	kind	of	“strong	emergence”	which	is	unpredictable	collective	
action,	the	kind	Third	Wave	HCI	looks	for,	portends	disaster	for	the	more	fragile	Apollo	system.		
The	Apollo	system	also	lends	itself	rather	well	to	Second	Wave	analysis	using	any	and	all	of	the	
frameworks	outlined	by	Nardi.	The	focus	of	the	system,	accomplishing	a	work-related	task	(albeit	a	
rather	grandiose	one)	is	the	same	kind	of	scenario	that	Second	Wave	HCI	aimed	to	unpack.	The	
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system	could	easily	be	thought	of	as	an	activity	system:	multiple	subjects	engage	in	actions	at	their	
consoles	by	repeating	multiple	operations	in	effort	to	achieve	the	goal	of	spaceflight.	Likewise,	by	
following	the	different	representations	of	the	state	of	the	system	across	multiple	console	positions	
we	could	produce	a	rather	robust	analysis	of	the	Apollo	mission	as	a	distributed	cognitive	system.	
Situated	Action	could	also	be	used	to	aptly	describe	the	actions	of	each	flight	controller	at	their	
console.	They	respond	to	salient	information	about	their	environment,	and	make	split-second	
decisions	based	on	that	information.		
	 A	Third	Wave	analysis	of	the	Apollo	system	might	also	be	done,	but	the	tightly	controlled	
“weak	emergence”	would	likely	render	it	rather	uninteresting.	NASA	engineers	were	consummate	
professionals	with	a	serious	job	to	do	and	were	not	using	their	consoles	to	play	games	or	chat	on	
social	media,	and	so	strongly	emergent	uses	would	be	rare	to	spot.	The	one	exception	might	be	
when	the	system	was	thrown	into	an	unpredicted	state,	as	in	the	events	of	the	Apollo	13	mission	
depicted	in	the	film	of	the	same	name.	In	cases	like	this	the	system	would	need	to	reconfigure	itself	
to	adapt	to	the	new	information	and	new	situation	and	emergence	would	be	necessary.	
Interestingly	though,	as	Liebergot	explains,	unless	there	was	some	catastrophic	failure,	only	
directly	affected	parts	of	the	system	would	be	reconfigured.	The	trajectory	in	a	system	like	this	is	to	
get	everything	back	to	a	known	state	as	quickly	as	possible,	stopping	everything	because	one	
console	starts	flashing	red	throws	everything	into	disarray	and	makes	matters	worse.	The	tight	
modularity	and	control	built	into	this	system	keeps	both	problems	and	solutions	as	isolated	as	they	
can	be,	preventing	strong	emergence.		
		 Ashby’s	“Law	of	Requisite	Variety”	(Ross	Ashby,	2011)	states	that	every	stable	system	
must	have	a	number	of	states	equal	to	that	of	its	environment.	It	must	be	able	to	produce	enough	
variety	to	counter	the	variations	in	its	context.	Apollo	13	is	a	good	example	of	this	law	in	action,	as	
the	environment	perturbs	the	system	into	an	unstable	state	through	the	introduction	of	an	
unpredicted	equipment	malfunction,	the	system	rushes	to	reorganize	itself	into	a	new	
configuration,	it	effectively	tries	to	match	variety	with	variety	and	stabilize	itself.	This	can	be	
difficult	for	tightly	engineered	systems,	but	is	much	easier	for	more	flexible	ones.	The	earlier	
discussion	of	SA,	DCog,	and	AT	suggests	that	these	three	approaches	have	something	to	say	about	
this	as	well.		
	 SA	is	the	one	most	closely	aligned	with	the	notion	of	an	adaptive	system.	The	user	adapts	
to	information	from	the	environment	in	an	improvisatory	way.	In	more	rigidly	constrained	systems	
this	might	be	simple	pattern	recognition—the	user	identifies	a	pattern	they	have	seen	before	and	
reacts	in	ways	that	they	know	are	likely	to	achieve	the	outcomes	they’ve	seen	before.	In	response	to	
new	environmental	perturbations	they	react	in	much	the	same	way,	a	tight	feedback	loop	ensures	
that	they	are	constantly	adjusting	until	they	see	a	stable	situation	they	recognize.	There	is	no	reason	
this	approach	could	not	be	increased	in	scale	to	describe	an	entire	system.	This	is	much	of	what	
DCog	does,	but	with	a	slightly	different	spin.	As	discussed	above	DCog	does	increase	the	boundary	
and	scale	of	the	analysis	when	compared	to	SA.	It	shifts	focus	away	from	the	individual	actor	and	
toward	the	system	as	a	whole,	but	it	also	still	looks	within	the	system	for	structured	interactions	
that	resemble	“cognition”	rather	than	for	improvisatory	adaptation	to	contextual	changes	outside	
the	system.	AT	does	seem	to	present	a	kind	of	middle	ground,	it	increases	the	boundary	of	the	
analysis	to	include	context	in	a	way	that	SA	does	not,	but	it	does	not	shift	the	scale	of	the	analysis	
upward	the	way	DCog	does,	it	still	focuses	on	individual	cognition	when	considering	interaction	
with	technological	artefacts.	To	bring	these	three	approaches	together	we	need	to	think	a	bit	
differently	a	bit	more	holistically	about	how	humans	and	machines	act	together	in	context.		
	 SA,	AT	and	DCog,	are	quite	good	at	deconstructing	and	analysing	sociotechnical	systems,	
they	each	have	their	particular	quirks,	and	there	are	trade-offs	in	using	each,	as	we	have	described.	
However,	when	it	comes	to	design,	they	have	proven	much	less	useful,	and	not	for	lack	of	trying.	
There	are	many	who	have	attempted	to	use	these	frameworks	to	aid	in	the	design	of	technological	
artefacts	and	the	results	are	mixed	at	best.	Analysis	and	synthesis	may	be	two	sides	of	the	same	
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coin,	but	they	are	different	processes.	Nonetheless	there	are	lessons	to	be	learned	from	these	
frameworks	when	it	comes	to	designing	the	kind	of	flexible	sociotechnical	systems	that	we	describe	
above.	While	we	stop	short	of	deriving	actual	design	principles,	recommendations,	and	processes,	
as	most	of	our	predecessors	in	this	endeavour	have	as	well,	what	we	do	offer	here	is	a	new	
approach	to	design	that	treats	context	itself	as	a	designed	artefact	rather	than	as	an	environment.	
We	refer	to	this	approach	as	multiscale	design	and	it	can	be	summarized	very	simply	as	any	
combination	of	design	processes	that	examine	two	(or	more)	scales	simultaneously	both	in	
isolation	and	in	terms	of	their	interconnections.		
	 As	a	complement	to	this	approach,	combining	SA	and	DCog	would	be	an	example	of	
multiscale	analysis.	DCog	can	be	used	to	describe	the	overall	system	and	how	it	achieves	its	goals	
within	a	given	context,	while	SA	can	be	used	to	describe	the	lower-scale	activity	of	individual	actors	
within	that	system	who’s	goals	are	smaller	and	more	modest	than	the	system	itself.	Again	the	
Apollo	system	serves	as	a	good	testbed	for	this	kind	of	procedure.	The	entire	system	can	be	
described	as	a	cognitive	system	with	processes	aimed	at	achieving	the	mission	objectives.	Each	
flight	controller	and	their	console	however	act	in	a	way	best	described	by	SA.	Combining	these	two	
levels	of	analysis	yields	complementary	results	and	a	more	robust	analysis	of	the	system.	AT	seems	
to	do	this	naturally.	It’s	constructs	form	a	hierarchy	of	scales,	there	is	the	overall	top-level	activity,	
the	smaller	scale	actions	and	the	even	smaller	scale	operations.	The	system	itself	achieves	it’s	goal,	
while	the	actors	within	it	accomplish	conscious	actions	using	lower-scale	automatic	unconscious	
operations	that	could,	presumably,	even	be	offloaded	to	a	machine	one	day.		
	 This	seems	to	suggest	that	multiscale	analysis	is	being	done	under	other	names,	but	
what	about	multiscale	design?	In	some	sense	the	answer	is	an	obvious	‘yes,’	after	all	the	Apollo	
missions	required	the	design	of	an	organizational	hierarchy,	of	man-machine	console	teams,	and	of	
the	technologies	themselves.	That	is	design	operating	at	three	scales.	This	process	must	have	been	
coordinated,	by	a	team	of	mission	planners	at	NASA	most	likely,	who	were	effectively	doing	
multiscale	design,	and	so	in	that	sense	this	approach	is	nothing	new.	Yet,	multiscale	design	as	an	
approach	in	own	right	has	never	been	named	and	its	practitioners	are	never	explicitly	trained	in	its	
principles	and	practices.	The	multiscale	design	of	the	Apollo	system	took	deep	knowledge	of	at	least	
three	disciplines,	organizational	management,	HCI,	and	computer	engineering.	This	is	different	than	
the	multi-disciplinary	engineering	that	was	described	earlier.	Simply	organizing	different	
disciplines	into	modules	in	a	way	that	enables	them	to	work	together	to	achieve	some	weakly	
emergent	goal	is	only	a	part	of	what	multiscale	design	is	about.	The	other	part	is	integrating	
disciplines	in	a	way	that	allows	them	to	incorporate	each	other’s	strengths	and	mitigate	their	
weaknesses	to	achieve	strongly	emergent	outcomes.	At	a	minimum,	multiscale	designers	would	be	
able	to	create	the	organizational	structure	necessary	to	support	the	adaptation	of	the	system,	create	
the	interfaces	and	procedures	that	give	human	users	the	flexibility	and	information	they	need,	and	
to	engineer	the	technology	that	is	required	for	getting	the	job	done,	whatever	it	turns	out	to	be.		
	 As	mentioned	above	this	requires	an	understanding	of	three	very	different	sets	of	
dynamics:	those	that	govern	the	organizational	structure	and	therefore	create	the	‘context’	as	HCI	
defines	it;	those	that	govern	the	interactions	between	people	and	machines;	and	those	that	govern	
the	machines	themselves.	These	are	three	largely	unrelated	disciplines	with	very	different	
expertise,	languages,	and	priorities.	Mastering	all	of	this	is	a	tall	order,	no	doubt,	and	we	are	not	
suggesting	that	anyone	could	or	should	take	on	designing	a	NASA	mission	on	their	own	using	a	
multiscale	approach;	although,	one	could	see	how	multiscale	training	might	benefit	such	an	
endeavour.	For	us,	the	issue	is	that	designers	are	not	trained	to	think	and	analyse	at	multiple	scales,	
at	least	not	explicitly,	and	they	are	not	trained	to	look	for	the	synergistic	opportunities	that	make	
multiscale	systems	work.	By	providing	the	language	and	aims	for	a	multiscale	approach	we	hope	to	
take	a	small	step	toward	recognizing	the	need	for	designers	trained	in	multiple	disciplines	that	
don’t	typically	overlap	horizontally,	but	that	do	influence	each	other	vertically	across	scales.	After	
all,	what	designer	hasn’t	been	frustrated	by	the	seeming	absurd	constraints	placed	on	them	by	
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‘stable	institutional	structures’?	What	manager	has	not	been	annoyed	by	designers	who	‘just	can’t	
see	the	big	picture’?	These	are	conditions	that	persist	in	any	organizational	environment.	They	stifle	
communication,	generate	conflict,	and	prevent	innovation.	If	nothing	else	multiscale	design	
promises	to	provide	a	bridge	between	worlds	that	don’t	speak	the	same	language;	not	because	they	
exist	across	any	chasm,	but	because	they	exist	directly	on	top	of	each	other.		
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